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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the barriers to risk-sharing among Indonesian house-
holds. We test alternative risk sharing models, namely full risk sharing,
borrowing-saving, saving only, hidden income, moral hazard and limited com-
mitment among households. Based on three waves of the Indonesia Family Life
Survey (IFLS) dataset, we find that the full risk-sharing hypothesis fails. A
nested regression framework suggested by Kinnan (2014) provides evidence in fa-
vor of the hidden income hypothesis. However, such a nested framework is unable
to discriminate between moral hazard and limited commitment. This motivates
us to resort to a non-nested framework. Within this non-nested framework, we
test two risk sharing models: (i) the Kocherlakota-Pistaferri (2010) moral haz-
ard model with full commitment and (ii) the Ligon et al. (2002) dynamic limited
commitment model. IFLS data reject (i) but there is weak evidence of (ii). Based
on this, we conclude that there are two hidden barriers to risk sharing among the
IFLS households, namely hidden income and limited commitment.
Subject headings: Keywords: credit access, risk sharing, limited commitment
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1. Introduction
Households in developing countries are vulnerable to income risks which could emanate
from various sources such as crop failure, job-loss, illness, accident to name a few. In the
presence of full insurance, these idiosyncratic risks can be pooled by the insurance markets
and an individual’s consumption is freed from dependence on his own income. However,
the absence of perfect insurance arrangement is pervasive in many emerging countries as
they do not have a well-developed financial system. Due to the absence of proper insurance
markets, households in these economies make informal risk sharing arrangements. There is
a growing literature documenting this kind of risk sharing arrangement (Platteau (1991),
Udry (1994), De Weerdt and Dercon (2006), Collins et al. (2010), Fafchamps and Ferrara
(2012), among others).
In this paper, we investigate the mode of risk sharing among the Indonesian households.
As one of the emerging economies, Indonesia has been struggling in developing its financial
systems. Majority of the population still have difficulty in accessing financial services.
Households, particularly those who are working in the informal sectors and in rural areas,
have little or no access to insurance and are often not aware of any basic social security
provided by the government. These people are vulnerable not only to idiosyncratic or
individual risks, but also to aggregate risks. For example, Thomas and Frakenberg (2007)
show that the financial crisis in 1997 has affected households in Indonesia across the board.
They also found that there was a significant increase in the incidence of poverty and a
decline in living standards as the crisis unfolded. The effects were indicated by lower levels
of consumption and income, decrease in households’ assets and a reduction in human capital
investment.
Our study is inspired by Kinnan (2014) who performs a similar exercise using panel
data for Thai households. While Kinnan uses Thai panel household data to test alternative
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risk sharing models, we use a large panel of Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) dataset
to test alternative risk sharing models. Kinnan conducts all the empirical tests based on
an econometric specification that nests alternative risk sharing models. We go beyond
Kinnan’s nested framework and test new risk sharing models which cannot be adequately
nested. The IFLS micro dataset is quite rich and detailed to enable us to undertake these
tests using relatively recent models of risk sharing in the presence of private information
and limited commitment.
Using three waves of a panel data of 10,435 IFLS households, we first undertake a
test of a standard full risk sharing among households which requires that each household’s
consumption should not depend on its own income if the risk sharing is perfect. After
adequately controlling for community waves and household fixed effects, we find that the
full risk sharing hypothesis is overwhelmingly rejected by the IFLS data. In the next step,
we test five extant models of risk sharing using a nested framework suggested by Kinnan
(2014). These five models are namely, (i) borrowing-saving (PIH), (ii) liquidity constraint
or saving only, (iii) moral hazard, (iv) limited commitment and (v) hidden income. Our
IFLS data reject borrowing-saving and saving only models and lend support to hidden
income hypothesis.
Kinnan’s nested framework cannot distinguish between moral hazard and limited
commitment scenarios. Thus even though one rejects both, one does not know which
environment is rejected, that is, moral hazard or limited commitment or both. To get a
better understanding of the risk sharing mechanism, we, therefore, resort to non-nested
frameworks. We dissociate moral hazard from limited commitment by picking the model
of Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009) which provides a testable hypothesis when there is
private information about efforts and types of agents but the risk sharing contract is subject
to full commitment. We call this the moral hazard only model. Our test with the IFLS
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waves reject this model.
Given that moral hazard only model is rejected by the IFLS data, the next test
candidate is limited commitment hypothesis. With limited commitment, households stay
in an informal risk sharing network which thrives on an arrangement of “quasi credits”
designed for mutual insurance as described in several studies such as Lund and Fafchamps
(1997) and Udry (1994). In most cases of such informal risk sharing networks, there are
no legal record or procedure to enforce repayment. The system is thus vulnerable to
reneging. For a sustainable informal risk sharing community network, it is important that
the long term benefit of helping each other in the risk sharing network must exceed the
short term cost of making a sacrifice. We pick a model of dynamic limited commitment
a` la Ligon et al. (2002). In such a model, in order to stay in a network with limited
commitment, each household follows a simple updating rule for the ratio of its own marginal
utility consumption to the marginal utility of consumption of the rest of households in the
community. This makes this marginal utility ratio history dependent. Since there is no
moral hazard element in this model, we call it a limited commitment only model. We find
some weak evidence in favour of limited commitment among the IFLS households.
2. Related Literature
Some early papers on risk sharing tests assumed complete market hypothesis to explain
consumption insurance across households. Moreover, the risk sharing hypothesis at the
household level is calibrated and tested using very rich data sources such as US Panel
Study Income Dynamics (Cochrane, 1991) and US Consumer Expenditure Survey (Mace,
1991). However, empirical investigations of full risk sharing using micro data tend to reject
the efficient risk sharing hypothesis. Using consumption, labor supply and wage data in
the United States, Attanasio and Davis (1996) conclude that consumption risk sharing is
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incomplete.
There is a growing literature on the study of risk sharing arrangement in developing
countries. Beck et al. (2008) show that many households in low-income countries do not
have adequate access to the financial services which are taken for granted by households in
developed countries. They found that these barriers have strong linkages with economic
development and financial accession measures. Therefore, households need to find an
efficient way to smooth their consumption and to insure themselves against idiosyncratic
shocks.
Other related studies investigate risk sharing arrangements formed by households
within the same unit, such as a village or a community. Within a community, the mechanism
may take place between families and friends who facilitate risk sharing between economic
agents, for instance between young and old, and between families in specific regions. Simply,
this can happen because there is mutual assistance among them. This becomes important
particularly for low-income and developing economies where access to finance is absent or
limited and risk becomes ubiquitous. The insurance mechanism is usually conducted via
state-contingent transfers such as in Townsend (1994) and Udry (1994).
However, such informal risk sharing arrangement is fragile due to the immutable
limited commitment of group members. The transfers between households in an implicit
contract may not occur perfectly if an individual does not comply with the group’s terms
and conditions. Another possible reason is that usually there is no collateral when risk
sharing groups emerge. Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002) develop a dynamic contract
theoretic model to derive the efficient consumption allocations in village economies and test
the model using Indian villages. We use their framework to test the risk sharing subject to
limited commitment among the IFLS households.
In the Indonesian context, Ravallion and Dearden (1988) study risk sharing in terms
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of private transfers between Javanese households in Indonesia using 1981 Susenas data.
They find a difference between rural and urban households in terms of transfer behavior.
Okten and Osili (2004) utilize IFLS1 and IFLS2 datasets to investigate how consumption
smoothing may occur from accessing the credit market. They find that social and
community networks are important in gaining access to credit markets. Witoelar (2013)
studies how risk sharing emerges within families using IFLS dataset. However, there is
hardly any study that investigates the barriers to insurance and alternative forms of risk
sharing specifically among Indonesian households.
3. A Survey of Key Models of Risk Sharing
In this section, we provide a brief survey of a few core models of risk sharing which are
taken to the data. The main thrust of this brief survey is to understand the structure of
the reduced form consumption-income relationships of households. This survey highlights
that different risk sharing arrangements imply different testable reduced form consumption
processes.
3.1. Full Risk Sharing
The perfect risk sharing model is based on the assumption of complete markets as in
Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Arrow (1964), widely known as the Arrow-Debreu model.
Under full insurance, each household’s consumption does not move in unison with its own
income because households can use the asset markets to pool individual income risks. To
test this, we can use Townsend’s (1994) standard test of full risk sharing using all waves of
data. The key risk sharing equation is given by:
ln ci,t = α ln yi,t + θi + γj + δt + εit (1)
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where ci,t denotes household i’s consumption at date t, yi,t denotes household i’s income at
date t , θi stands for household fixed effect, γj denotes village or community fixed effect, δt
denotes wave effect, and εit denotes irregular noise. The key null hypothesis is α = 0. If
the term α is significant, it implies that household i’s income tracks its consumption. This
means rejection of full risk sharing hypothesis.
3.2. Limited Risk Sharing
If full risk sharing breaks down, several possibilities of limited risk sharing lend
themselves. Households may operate in an incomplete market environment with an access
to borrowing and lending at a risk-free rate. We call these models as borrowing-saving or
permanent income hypothesis (PIH) models because these models are mostly designed to
smooth consumption over time in the spirit of traditional permanent income hypothesis.1
Hall (1978) shows that in such an environment marginal utility follows a random
walk. Alternatively, households may only be able to save but not to borrow (liquidity
constrained). This means that the standard Euler equation is not applicable because of
liquidity constraints. Following Deaton (1991), this leads to a saving-only model where
the lagged income may contain information that cannot be captured by consumption in
the same period. The current consumption could be then higher than the last period’s
consumption when the household experiences a low last period income. The underlying
rationale is that if income is a mean reverting process, a low income shock last period may
indicate that a liquidity constrained household who cut back last period consumption would
increase today’s consumption to smooth consumption over time.
1Of course the notion of consumption smoothing can be broadened to include full risk
sharing models where the consumption smoothing happens across states.
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In a moral hazard model, work effort in the production process is private information to
the household. Introducing incentive constraints on the household to elicit effort invalidates
full insurance and gives rise to an inverse Euler equation first derived by Rogerson (1985)
as follows:
βREt−1u′(cit)−1 = u′(cit−1)−1 (2)
where β denotes the subjective discount factor, R denotes interest rate and u′(cit) is the
marginal utility of consumption of the i-th household at date t, Et−1 is the expectation at
date t− 1. Kinnan (2014) uses the methodology of Fernandes and Phelan (2000) and show
that such a lagged inverse Euler equation representation is robust when the distribution of
income depends on past and the current effort. Besides the shadow price of the resources of
the community, the household’s inverse marginal utility is independent of all information at
date t − 1. Thus adding household’s income on the right hand side of (2) will not provide
any additional explanatory power.
When effort is contractible but the community does not observe household’s income,
it gives rise to another form of barrier to insurance known as hidden income. Thomas and
Worrall (1990) derive optimal contracting arrangement under which the household finds it
incentive compatible not to hide its income. Using this lead, Kinnan (2014) shows that
under hidden income, the inverse Euler equation formulation (2) is modified by inclusion
of the lagged income (yit−1) with a non-negative coefficient as an additional explanatory
variable.
Another friction could emerge if the household could potentially walk away from an
insurance network at any time by going to autarky. This form of barrier to risk sharing
is known as limited commitment. To prevent such defection, a planner has to impose a
participation constraint on the household. Kinnan (2014) shows that such a constraint
again gives rise to an inverse Euler equation structurally similar to (2). This gives rise to
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a difficulty in disentangling a limited commitment model from a standard moral hazard
inverse Euler equation.
3.2.1. A Nested Formulation of Limited Risk Sharing Models
Following Kinnan (2014), we resort to a nested formulation of five models of limited
risk sharing namely, (i) borrowing-saving (PIH), (ii) liquidity constraint or saving only,
(iii) limited commitment, (iv) moral hazard, and (v) hidden income. (i) and (ii) involve
a standard Euler equation while (iii), (iv) and (v) involve an inverse Euler equation as in
(2) which implies a nonlinear relationship current consumption (cit), lagged consumption
(cit−1), lagged income (yit−1) and shadow price of village resources (ηt). With a log utility
specification, Kinnan derives the following loglinear specification:
cit = αcit−1 + βcit−1ηt + θηt + γyit−1 (3)
where ηt is the village-wave fixed effect measured by
∑
j 6=i
cj
Nv−1 with Nv being the size of
the village v. All three models of limited risk sharing, namely (iii), (iv) and (v) suggest the
presence of the multiplicative term cit−1ηt. If β = γ = 0, it reduces to PIH models (i). If
β = 0 but γ < 0, then the data lend support for saving only model. If β 6= 0, θ 6= 0, but
γ > 0 then data support to hidden income hypothesis (v). On the other hand, if β and θ are
nonzero but γ = 0, one cannot distinguish between moral hazard and limited commitment
models.
3.3. Non-nested models of limited risk sharing
Since Kinnan’s nested framework is unable to distinguish between moral hazard and
limited commitment, one needs to study moral hazard and limited commitment models
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separately. We now consider two non-nested models, one focusing on moral hazard and the
other concentrating on limited commitment.
3.3.1. Kocherlakota-Pistaferri (2009) moral hazard model
Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (KP hereafter) model an environment where households
join a community and agree to exert effort to produce output for the community. An
example is the case of households forming an informal group to cultivate crop for the
community. Household’s income is not private information but its effort and productivity
are. In such a scenario, the household has an incentive to shirk (moral hazard) or
misrepresent its type (adverse selection). KP derive the efficient contracting arrangement
of this scenario by setting up a constrained social planning problem where the social
planner offers a contract of consumption and work effort to the participating households
in a community which maximizes their expected utility subject to two constraints, namely
(i) a participation constraint ensuring not to walk away to an autarky, and (ii) a truth
telling constraint which means that the household has no incentive to shirk or misrepresent
its type. The first order condition gives rise to again an inverse Euler equation as in
(2). Invoking the law of large numbers, Kocherlakota and Pistaferri derive the following
stochastic discount factor (sdft−1,t) based on cross sectional raw moments of consumption
of the households in the community between dates t − 1 and t which they call Private
Information Pareto Optimal (PIPO) sdf:
sdft−1,t =
C
γ
t−1
C
γ
t
(4)
where C
γ
t−1 is the γ
th cross sectional raw moment in the community at date t− 1 and γ is
the relative risk aversion parameter. Due to the application of law of large numbers, this
sdf is robust to the stochastic process generating household’s hidden skills and thus it does
not depend on household’s longitudinal history of characteristics. In addition, it is robust
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to possible mismeasurement of consumption.
The moral hazard environment of KP model is fundamentally different from Kinnan’s
formulation. In KP’s moral hazard model, a social planner solves a constrained allocation
problem where it is incentive compatible for the households to reveal its type and effort
and participate in such a contract market that opens only once at the start of time. This
contract is, therefore, a full commitment contract which means that the household after
signing such a contract cannot renege or re-contract. In Kinnan’s formulation we cannot
distinguish between moral hazard and limited commitment. In the KP model, there is no
issue of limited commitment because agents have full commitment to start with. Thus we
call KP a model of moral hazard only.2
The PIPO sdf can be applied to a wide class of incomplete market environments.3
Applying this to a simple credit market environment as in the preceding consumption
smoothing model where households have access to borrowing and lending at a gross risk
free rate R, the standard Euler equation can be written as:
Et−1
RC
γ
t−1
C
γ
t
= 1 (5)
which Et−1 is the expectation operator at date t−1. Taking the log-transform and assuming
homoskedastic errors, we can rewrite (5) as a regression equation as log-linear random walk
process for the γth cross-sectional raw moment of consumption,
lnC
γ
t = a+ lnC
γ
t−1 + εt (6)
2Strictly speaking, KP model also incorporates adverse selection. At any date, agent’s
effort and type are both private information. We abstract from these details and label KP
as a moral hazard model without any issue of commitment.
3Basu et al. (2011) apply this PIPO discount factor to test international risk sharings.
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where a denotes a constant and εt denotes the residual error. Motivated by this random
walk specification of the cross sectional raw moments, we propose the following regression
to test Kocherlakota and Pistaferri’s risk sharing model of private information (2009) for
each community:
ln
(∑Nk
i=1 c
γ
ik,t
Nk
)
= α0 + α1 ln
(∑Nk
i=1 c
γ
ik,t−1
Nk
)
+ α2 ln yk,t−1 + θk + εk,t (7)
where cik,t is household i’s consumption in community k at date t, yk,t denotes average
income at community k at date t, θk denotes the community-fixed effect, and εk,t denotes
error terms. Nk is different from community to community. If this risk sharing environment
is true, α1 should be close to unity and no other variables such as past income of the
community should have any additional explanatory power in determining the left hand side
cross sectional raw moment which means that α2 should equal zero for a plausible range of
risk aversion parameter, γ.
3.3.2. Dynamic Limited Commitment Model of Ligon et al. (2002)
The contract stipulated by KP is not time consistent due to full commitment
assumption. Agents can sign such a contract at date zero but renege on it at a later date
due to limited commitment. Thus limited commitment needs to be modelled separately in a
non-nested framework. In the Ligon et al. (2002) model of limited commitment, households
form an informal risk sharing group with a ”quasi credit” arrangement. There are no
written records, legal provisions, or collateral to enforce repayment. There is an implicit
understanding that there may be delay in repayment or forgiving of the debt in extenuating
circumstances. Agents still form such informal risk sharing arrangement because the
perceived long term benefits of adhering to such group may outweigh the short term costs.
Assuming a finite state Markov process for income, Ligon et al. consider first a bilateral
risk sharing arrangement where it is not incentive compatible for any of the households to
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break away from such a contract and go to autarky. In this model, agents are only subject
to a participation constraint and there is no issue of private information about effort and
type. This makes the Ligon et al. (2002) model a limited commitment only model without
any issue of moral hazard. The optimal contracting arrangement in Ligon et al. gives rise
to a simple updating rule for the marginal utility ratio of any two participating households
in such a bilateral contract. The marginal utility ratio becomes history dependent if any of
the household members is constrained in the sense that she receives the minimum surplus
from staying in the network. The minimum surplus is defined as the surplus which keeps
her indifferent between staying in the network or going to autarky.
The bilateral risk sharing arrangement is not realistic in the context of IFLS households
because typically risk sharing group involves more than two households in a village. We,
therefore, use a variant of the estimation equation suggested by Ligon et al. (2002) in the
context of a power utility. We consider the efficient contract between a typical household
(i) in each village with the rest of households in the same village. In other words, we run
the following regression:
cit
−
c−i,t
= α0 + α1
cit−1
−
c−i,t−1
+ α2(village characteristics) + ξit (8)
where
−
c−i,t denotes the average consumption of all households in the same village except
the ith household and ξit denotes random disturbance term. These village characteristics
could be of several kinds, namely existence of formal risk sharing arrangement, proximity
to formal financial institutions, relative preponderance of urban to rural households. After
controlling for these effects, if α1 is found to be statistically significant, it means history
dependence of the consumption share of a participating household in the community.
This can be viewed as an evidence of dynamic limited commitment in the risk sharing
arrangement.4
4Note that a lack of history dependence does not necessarily mean an absence of limited
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Table 1 summarizes all the risk sharing arrangements reviewed in this section.
(INSERT TABLE 1 HERE)
4. Data
All our data are gathered from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). These
longitudinal surveys consist of two levels: community and household surveys where the
latter can be decomposed into individual and family levels. There are four waves available:
IFLS1 in 1993, IFLS2 in 1997, IFLS3 in 2000, and IFLS4 in 2007. In IFLS, around 90% of
sample households are retained from the first wave until the latest which is considered to
be the advantage of using this dataset to make an economic analysis of risk sharing and
related testable implications. For this study, we only use IFLS data up until Wave 3.5
For the empirical analysis, we make sure that the data fulfill some basic conditions:
(i) all necessary information regarding household variables are available, meaning that
only households that exist for all waves are considered, (ii) relevant variables, particularly
commitment risk sharing. The history dependence arises when one of the participants in the
risk sharing network is constrained in the sense that he/she is held down to the minimum
surplus to keep this risk sharing arrangement viable. In the absence of such corner solu-
tion, the consumption ratio remains time invariant which replicates a first best risk sharing
scenario within a limited commitment framework. We abstract from this complication by
assuming that at least one household member in the network is always constrained which
makes the consumption ratio history dependent.
5We cannot utilize IFLS4 data due to inadequate information about the consumption
data making it difficult to compare across waves.
– 16 –
consumption and income, do not take extreme values6; and (iii) households stay within
their villages for the whole period.
In IFLS1, the number of households is 7,224 while in IFLS3, there are 10,435
households. For testing the Kinnan’s (2014) nested regression model, KP (2009) model and
Ligon et al. (2002) model, we cannot use the whole sample due to the restriction imposed
by the balanced nature of the panel. Many households cannot be observed across two
successive waves mostly due to family migration and incomplete household characteristics
such as employment and socio-economic status. In most cases, we work with around 3,194
households who live in 310 villages or communities.
The consumption is measured by per capita expenditure (PCE) and the income is also
measured by per capita income (PCI). This means that the consumption and income for
each household is divided by the number of people living in that household. For the last
two waves, around one third of IFLS households have five or more persons living within
a household. Households with 2, 3 and 4 persons are relatively similar for waves 2 and
3 surveys. The descriptive statistics for relevant analysis are given in Table 2. Figure 1
plots the averages of community consumption and income as a summary description of the
data. The upward sloping nature of the scatter indicates that full risk sharing hypothesis is
unlikely to be supported by the data.
(INSERT TABLE 2 AND FIGURE 1 HERE)
To examine private information model with hidden efforts, we use information
at community level by summing up all household consumption and income within a
6Extreme values are defined as five percentiles from the top and bottom of the distribu-
tion.
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community which is the same as village in the IFLS data. We then compute raw moments
for all communities in IFLS using (7) in order to assess risk sharing model with private
information.
To test dynamic limited commitment models as formulated in (8) we use community
(or village) as a risk sharing unit. Since in the dynamic limited commitment model our aim
is to test for the memory of the contractual arrangement, it is important that we have a
balanced panel with the same households observed in two successive waves. This restricts
us to waves 2 and 3 with about 2,999 households. We use community data that exist from
IFLS1 to IFLS3. This leaves us with 310 communities for this test. Based on IFLS1, the
average number of households within a community is 16.5 households. Each household’s
consumption in a community is divided by the average consumption of all households in
the same community based on the regression Equation (8). Since only two waves of data
are used, the limited commitment regression thus reduces to a cross-sectional regression.
To assess risk sharing within communities, the IFLS provides information about
community participation known as Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCA
for short) for each respondent along with individual social and economic characteristics.
ROSCAs (or Arisan) have long been known in Indonesia as a part of the social and
economic tradition. Indonesian households use various forms of ROSCA to share their
risk. With diverse demographic characteristics, ROSCAs are generally formed by group of
people who usually congregate weekly and pass part of the pooled assets in certain ways
using either a random pot or a systematic rotation scheme. Since ROSCAs use a simpler
approach to conducting financial contract than formal financial institutions, a lot of people,
especially those who are credit constrained, prefer to use it as a risk sharing vehicle. This
makes ROSCAs specifically a good candidate for using it as a village fixed effects for limited
commitment regressions. Unfortunately, IFLS1 does not have information about ROSCAs.
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This is another reason why we use the data from IFLS3 and IFLS2 to test dynamic limited
commitment models.
4.1. Choice of instruments
The empirical specification such as in Equation (1) may suffer from two potential
problems. These problems may arise if ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators are applied
to estimate equations that include consumption and income, namely the endogeneity of
income change and income measurement error. Similar issue arises also for the nested
empirical specification (3). To address these potential problems, we use two sets of
instrumental variables (IVs) for household and community level tests. For household level,
we have asset measures, health measures and rainfall rate. The justification for using the
first two variables as instruments is that households with greater physical and human assets
are likely to have higher income. The first instrument is household assets which include
current and fixed assets. In the IFLS data, these household assets include the house,
vehicles, appliances, savings, jewelry, furniture and utensils. We also include assets that are
used by households for farming and non-farming businesses.
Our second instrument is activities for daily living (called ADL hereafter). ADL is a
measure that indicates the physical ability of an individual to perform daily living activities.
The reliability and validity of ADLs have been tested extensively, mainly in the United
States and Southeast Asia.7 The ADL is transformed into an index as follows:
ADL Score−Min. Score
Max. Score−Min. Score.
The ADL index takes on values from 0 to 1, where zero is when the individual cannot
7Gertler and Gruber (2002) provide more explanation about the reliability and validity
of ADLs in this regard.
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perform any ADLs at all and one is when the individual can easily perform all of the
ADLs.8ADL is deemed to be a good instrument because it is likely to be strongly correlated
with income because individuals with greater physical ability are likely to generate more
income.
It is conceivable that asset of the household could be correlated with consumption
and thus making it a weak instrument. To mitigate this problem we use rainfall as an
additional instrument which is likely to be strongly correlated with income. Since most of
the regions in Indonesia are dominated by agricultural occupation, rainfall is an effective
instrumental variable (see for example Fichera and Savage, 2015). The daily rainfall data
are obtained from the Indonesian Agency for Meteorological, Climatological and Geophysics
(BMKG). We use the previous year’s average precipitation for each IFLS wave respectively,
then match these data using community data using altitude and longitude to nearest
BMKG weather station. The data from 25 BMKG stations are matched with 310 IFLS
communities. The matching process is done by calculating a community location to the
nearest station.
8In IFLS, the ADLs are divided into several components. These are namely, ability to
carry a heavy load for 20 meters, ability to walk for 5 kilometers, ability to walk for 10
kilometers, ability to bow, squat and kneel, ability to sweep the house floor, ability to draw
a pail of water from a well, ability to stand up from sitting on the floor without help, ability
to stand up from sitting position in a chair without help, ability to bathe without help, and
ability to dress without help. The first four activities are classified as intermediate ADLs,
while the last five activities are classified as the basic ADLs.
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5. Empirical Results
5.1. Full Risk Sharing Tests
We undertake tests given in Equation (1) is employed. The results are presented
in Table 3 for five specifications. Column (1) reports OLS results with random effects
only which means θi = γj = δt = 0. Column (2) reports the regression after adjusting for
heteroskedasticity including household fixed effects but without any village and wave effects
which means θi 6= 0, and γj = δt = 0. Column (3) reports results with heteroskedasticity
adjustment with all three effects included which means θi 6= 0, γj 6= 0, and δt 6= 0. Column
(4) reports the OLS regression with θi 6= 0, δt 6= 0 and by computing the clustered standard
error to allow correlation between IFLS households’ unobservable within each village. All
these four specifications reject the full risk sharing hypothesis because the estimate of the
log of income is significant at the one percent level.
A potential problem with the regressions reported in Columns (1) through (4) is that
a classical measurement error and endogeneity could make the regression coefficient of
income biased. This bias is the result of the correlation between the right hand side income
variable and the error term. To deal with these issues, we instrument these regressions.
All our three instruments are used namely, ADL of the household head, log of household’s
assets, and rainfall rate. The last rainfall instrument is specifically chosen to deal with the
issue of exogeneity of income. Column (5) reports the IV-2SLS regression with clustered
standard error.9 Our IVs pass the usual Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, and the
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic of underidentification. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic
exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical value suggesting that our IVs are not weak. This battery of
9Since standard errors are already clustered, we drop the village fixed effects which means
γj = 0.
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tests basically suggests that our three IVs are adequate. This IV regression clearly rejects
the full risk sharing hypothesis because log of income is significant at the 5 percent level.
All these five specifications thus overwhelmingly reject the full risk sharing hypothesis.
(INSERT TABLE 3 HERE)
The IV regressions with all its diagnostics basically suggests that our IVs are strong
which take adequate care of the classical measurement errors but it does not necessarily
address the endogeneity issue. To deal with the issue of endogeneity, we follow the regression
based endogeneity test procedure mentioned in Wooldridge (2002, section 6.2.1). We first
regress income (yit) on all our three instruments namely, rainfall, ADL, and household
asset. In the second step we regress cit, on the fitted yit and the residual from the first step
regression. The coefficient of yit in the second step regression is consistent by construction.
In Table 4, we report this additional test for endogeneity. Note that the coefficient of yit is
0.25 which is significant at the 1 percent level based on the heteroskedasticity corrected t
ratio. This additional two-step regression takes care of the endogeneity issue.
(INSERT TABLE 4 HERE)
5.2. Nested regression
Given that the full risk sharing hypothesis is overwhelmingly rejected by the IFLS
data, we next turn to testing limited risk sharing models. Table 5 reports the results of the
nested regression (3) for alternative limited risk sharing models. We follow Kinnan (2014)
by undertaking an OLS regression adding the village-wave fixed effect via the term ηt. We
do not run a conventional fixed effect regression to avoid Nickell (1981) bias due to limited
number of waves.
– 22 –
(INSERT TABLE 5 HERE)
The key results of this nested regression are presented in Table 5. Column (1) presents
simple OLS regression while Column (2) reports IV regressions with the same three variables
included as IVs. Our IVs pass all the diagnostics including the Sargan-Hansen test. Both
these regressions suggest that the nonlinear term involving the interaction between the
lagged consumption and the village-wave fixed effect is significant. This means that the
PIH and saving only model are rejected. The lagged income is found to be positive and
statistically significant which suggests evidence of hidden income. In Table 6 we report
the same nested regression for agriculture only as a further robustness check and the same
conclusion is reached.
(INSERT TABLE 6 HERE)
5.3. Moral hazard only regression
Since Kinnan’s nested framework is unable to discriminate between moral hazard and
limited commitment, we next report the test results of moral hazard only model. Table 7
reports the KP raw moment regression in Equation (7) involving 310 communities for the
risk aversion parameter, γ ranging from 1 to 2. To deal with the issue of measurement error
and endogeneity, we use the same three instruments but averaged across all households
within each village namely, average of household assets in each community, average of
ADLs and the rainfall rate in each village from the previous year. Our diagnostics including
Hansen, Kleibergen-Paap rk, and Cragg-Donald tests suggest that IVs are adequate for all
specifications. For all six specifications, the lagged community average log income is found
to statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that the moral hazard only
model is rejected by the IFLS data.
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(INSERT TABLE 7 HERE)
5.4. Limited commitment only regression
Turning now to the limited commitment only model of Ligon et al. (2002) based on the
regression in Equation (8), we regress the consumption ratio of each household in IFLS3 on
the corresponding consumption ratio of IFLS2. Since our regression analysis is focused on
these two waves only, it is a cross section regression and therefore, the endogeneity is less of
a concern but we still need to worry about measurement error and omitted variable bias.
To deal with this, we resort to an IV regression using the same three IVs for each wave. For
village characteristics, we choose two controls namely, (i) the presence ROSCA households
in a village, and (ii) the preponderance of households with agriculture only occupations. For
each of these characteristics, we add an intercept dummy. Instead of village fixed effects,
these village characteristics are chosen to avoid the Nickell bias resulting from limited
number of waves.
Table 8 provides the estimation results for limited commitment. The first column shows
the result of a simple OLS regression taking into account the heterogeneity of households
within and across all villages. This is done by a simple heteroskedasticity correction of the
standard error. Column (2) reports an IV-2SLS regression with clustered standard errors
at the village level to deal with unobserved heterogeneity of households within the same
village. Our IVs pass the Sargan test.
Although in our OLS regression, the lagged consumption ratio term is not significant,
t ratio is significant at a 10 percent level in the IV regression suggesting weak evidence
for limited commitment. We also investigate the possibility of households participating in
ROSCA sharing risk more than non-ROSCA households. This is done by interacting the
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ROSCA dummy with the lagged consumption ratio. The results are reported in Column
(3) of Table 8. Since this interaction dummy is insignificant, we do not find any compelling
evidence of greater risk sharing among ROSCA households.
Our regression result suggests that once measurement errors and village level clustering
are properly taken into account by the IV regression, there is evidence in favour of the
history dependence of the marginal utility ratio along the line suggested by Ligon et al.
(2002). This history dependence arises when at least one of the participants in the risk
sharing network is constrained in the sense that he/she is held down to the minimum
surplus to keep this risk sharing arrangement viable.
(INSERT TABLE 8 HERE)
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the barriers to risk sharing among Indonesian households using
three waves of IFLS data. Using the extant theoretical literature on risk sharing hypothesis,
we test six key risk sharing models. A daunting challenge to testing these risk sharing
models using household consumption and income data is the presence of measurement
errors and endogeneity which can make the relevant estimates biased. To take care of
these issues, we run a battery of tests which include testing overidentifying restrictions,
weakness of instruments, and direct test of endogeneity. Our study overwhelmingly rejects
full sharing among IFLS households. Using a nested regression framework, we also reject
standard borrowing-saving and saving-only models. As in Kinnan (2014), we also find
evidence of the hidden income hypothesis. Our IFLS data reject a non-nested moral hazard
only model a` la KP (2009) while there is weak evidence in favour of Ligon et al. (2002)
limited commitment only model. Thus unlike Kinnan (2014), we cannot rule out limited
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commitment as another candidate posing a potential barrier to risk sharing among IFLS
households.
The rejection of full risk sharing model and alternative models of risk sharing involving
imperfect credit markets is not surprising given the pervasive failure of formal credit and
insurance markets in these economies. This gives rise to the possibility of informal networks
among the Indonesian households. Our study suggests that these networks are fragile
because of the immutable human incentive to hide income information as well as not to
fully commit to the rules of a village network. A long term solution to remedy all these
barriers to risk sharing is to improve household’s access to credit market by establishing
appropriate financial institutions. Given that such macro policies of financial deepening
could take time and resources, piecemeal solutions on a case by case basis could help. The
ROSCA network with proper monitoring can be expanded to reach more people in a rural
economy. In addition, the government could promote the micro credit agencies to access the
villages. More innovative local monitoring and moral suasion of people in a network could
straighten commitment among the group members. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) provide
several case studies of success stories of this kind of moral suasion in the context of rural
India. These steps do not necessarily eliminate the problems of hidden income and limited
commitment but could help overcome these barriers to risk sharing.
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Table 1: Summary of Risk Sharing Hypotheses and Related Tests
Specification Expected Sign
Full Risk Sharing Eq (1) α = 0
Nested Models of Risk Sharing, Kinnan (2014)
PIH Eq (3) β = γ = 0
Saving Only Eq (3) β = 0 and γ < 0
Hidden Income Eq (3) β 6= 0 and γ > 0
Moral Hazard or Limited Commitment Eq (3) β 6= 0 and γ ≥ 0
Non-nested Models of Risk Sharing
Moral Hazard Only (KP, 2010) Eq (7) α2 = 0
Limited Commitment Only (Ligon et al, 2002) Eq (8) α1 6= 0
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
IFLS1 − 1993
log(Asset) 3,160 16.419 1.8037 9.1528 22.6116
log(PCE) 3,194 11.9568 0.7732 9.3117 15.645
log(PCI) 3,194 10.3974 2.0141 0.9641 18.6922
ADLs 3,194 0.9672 0.0851 0 1
Rainfall rate 3,194 5.3455 1.597 2.789 9.2575
IFLS2 − 1997
log(Asset) 2,994 17.0124 1.8666 7.6834 23.2693
log(PCE) 3,194 12.3716 0.7755 9.9135 17.2958
log(PCI) 3,194 11.5133 1.4148 -1.5757 18.8558
ADLs 3,194 0.9673 0.0851 0 1
Rainfall rate 3,039 5.3502 1.605 2.789 9.2575
IFLS3 − 2000
log(Asset) 3,075 16.9376 1.8656 6.2146 22.497
log(PCE) 3,194 12.3821 0.7097 10.2886 15.5103
log(PCI) 3,194 11.5633 1.1696 5.6268 17.2419
ADLs 3,194 0.9599 0.0999 0 1
Rainfall rate 2,936 5.3339 1.6018 2.789 9.2575
Note. — Per capita income (PCI) and per capita consumption (PCE) figures are in monthly and in 2000
Indonesia rupiah. The values are transformed into logarithmic values. ADLs denote activities of daily living
index. Log of household assets are calculated from total value of assets for each household in 2000 Indonesia
rupiah.
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Table 3: Full Risk Sharing: Individual and Community Level
Log of per capita expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log of per capita 0.170∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.0542∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗
income (0.006432) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.00784) (0.0457)
Households 3914 3914 3914 3914 2983
Observations 9582 9582 9582 9582 8647
R2 0.2163 0.095 0.239 0.7249 0.191
Wald χ2(1) 1793.32
p-value 0.000
F-stat 335.5 7.60 166.5
p-value 0.00 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 58.516
Chi-sq(2) p-value 0.000
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat 36.017
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat 30.371
Hansen J−statistic 0.439
χ2(1) p-value 0.507
Estimation method RE FE FE OLS IV-2SLS
(robust (robust (robust (clustered- (clustered-
error) error) error) robust error) robust error)
Fixed effects No FEs HH FE only All FEs HH & wave only All FEs
Note. — All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. RE means random effects, and FE means fixed
effects. In Column (4), ADLs of the household’s head, log of household assets, and rainfall rate are used as
instruments. The number of clusters is 310 villages. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by
∗ , at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
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Table 4: Full risk sharing: checking endogeneity
Log of per capita expenditure
(1) (2)
ADLs -0.0716
(0.331)
Log of assets 0.230∗∗∗
(0.0178)
Rainfall rate -0.0734∗∗∗
(0.00957)
Residuals -0.136∗∗∗
(0.0278)
Log of per capita income 0.250∗∗∗
(0.0265)
Constant 7.723∗∗∗ 9.437∗∗∗
(0.425) (0.294)
Households 3185 3185
Observations 8849 8849
R-sq within 0.038 0.102
F-stat 68.59 185.6
p-value 0.000 0.000
Estimation method FE FE
Note. — All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. This table provides instrument checks for full risk
sharing tests in Table 3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the
10% level are denoted by ∗ , at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
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Table 5: Nested regressions
Log of per capita expenditure
(1) (2)
Log of previous per capita consumption 0.452∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.0275) (0.0353)
Log of previous per capita consumption×η -0.0543∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0337)
Log of previous per capita income 0.0285∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗
(0.00559) (0.0432)
η 0.289∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0280)
Constant 4.255∗∗∗ 7.584∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.495)
Observations 6232 5928
Households 3116 2964
Wald χ2(4) 1735.1 573.10
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.00
Sargan-Hansen statistic 0.056
χ2(1) p-value 0.8129
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 125.083
χ2(2) p-value 0.0000
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 72.06
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 63.445
Estimation method OLS IV-2SLS
Note. — All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. η is in log form. Instruments used in Column (2)
are the log of asset of the previous wave and rainfall rate of the previous wave. Robust standard errors in
parentheses for Column (1) and (2). Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by ∗ , at the 5%
level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
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Table 6: Nested regressions: Agriculture
Log of per capita expenditure
(1) (2)
Log of previous per capita consumption 0.439∗∗∗ 0.105
(0.0615) (0.109)
Log of previous per capita consumption×η -0.0756 -0.142∗
(0.0442) (0.0655)
Log of previous per capita income 0.0210 0.405∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.111)
η 0.214∗∗∗ 0.175∗
(0.0507) (0.0704)
Constant 6.031∗∗∗ 7.868∗∗∗
(0.643) (1.035)
Observations 1072 1011
Households 544 537
Wald χ2(4) 177.63 93.83
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.00
Sargan-Hansen statistic 0.616
χ2(2) p-value 0.4327
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 27.475
χ2(2) p-value 0.0000
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 13.188
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 13.927
Estimation method OLS IV-2SLS
Note. — All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. η is in log form. Instruments used in Column (2)
are the ADLs of the household’s head from the previous wave, the log of asset of the previous wave and
rainfall rate of the previous wave. Robust standard errors in parentheses for Column (1) and (2). Coefficients
significant at the 10% level are denoted by ∗ , at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. from IFLS
dataset.
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Fig. 1.— The averages of community consumption and income.
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Table 7: Moral hazard only regressions
Consumption moment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
γ value 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00
Log of previous -0.618∗∗∗ -0.646∗∗∗ -0.663∗∗∗ -0.671∗∗∗ -0.674∗∗∗ -0.675∗∗∗
consumption moment (0.0771) (0.0742) (0.0721) (0.0706) (0.0694) (0.0686)
Average log of 0.214∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗
previous income (0.0592) (0.0732) (0.0882) (0.104) (0.121) (0.137)
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 620
Community 310 310 310 310 310 310
R-square 0.473 0.502 0.515 0.518 0.515 0.509
adj. R-square -0.060 -0.002 0.024 0.029 0.023 0.012
F−statistics 55.11 61.78 66.16 68.55 69.58 69.80
p−value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 36.478 40.417 43.87 46.698 48.934 50.673
χ2(3) p−value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat. 17.134 18.893 20.329 21.471 22.375 23.093
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. 10.436 11.529 12.467 13.230 13.836 14.316
Hansen J statistic 0.556 0.570 0.573 0.572 0.569 0.566
χ2(2) p−value 0.757 0.752 0.7507 0.7512 0.7522 0.7533
Note. — This table presents moral hazard tests using raw moment simulations based on (7). All variables
are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. Instruments used in this estimation are average of household asset in a
community, average of ADLs, and rainfall. Robust IV-2SLS estimations with fixed-effects are employed.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by ∗ , at
the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
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Table 8: Limited commitment only regression
Consumption ratio: Wave 3
(1) (2) (3)
Consumption ratio: Wave 2 0.0396 0.505∗ 0.527∗
(0.0234) (0.214) (0.249)
Join Rosca =1 0.352∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.478
(0.0859) (0.0911) (0.275)
Agriculture = 1 -0.106∗∗ 0.00661 0.00572
(0.0383) (0.0463) (0.0468)
Join Rosca × consumption ratio (Wave 2) -0.184
(0.273)
Constant 1.020∗∗∗ 0.442∗ 0.418
(0.0374) (0.208) (0.244)
Households 2999 2745 2745
R2 0.031
F−statistics 8.79
p−value 0.0000
Wald χ2(4) 31.42 33.51
p−value 0.0000 0.0000
Wu-Hausman 75.6824 68.442
p−value 0.0000 0.0000
Sargan χ2(2) 0.4832 0.4298
p−value 0.7854 0.8066
Estimation method OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS
Robust Cluster robust Cluster robust
Note. — All variables are in 2000 Indonesian rupiah. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
instruments are log of asset, ADLs and rainfall rate in the previous wave. Coefficients significant at the 10%
level are denoted by ∗ , at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
